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Abstract
Background: The effectiveness of biosecurity methods to mitigate the transmission of porcine epidemic diarrhea
virus (PEDV) via farm personnel or contaminated fomites is poorly understood. This study was undertaken to
evaluate the effectiveness of biosecurity procedures directed at minimizing transmission via personnel following
different biosecurity protocols using a controlled experimental setting.
Results: PEDV RNA was detected from rectal swabs of experimentally infected (INF) and sentinel pigs by real-time
reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR). Virus shedding in INF pigs peaked at 1 day post infection
(dpi) and viral RNA levels remained elevated through 19 dpi. Sentinel pigs in the low biosecurity group (LB)
became PEDV positive after the first movement of study personnel from the INF group. However, rectal swabs from
pigs in the medium biosecurity (MB) and high biosecurity (HB) groups were negative during the 10 consecutive
days of movements and remained negative through 24 days post movement (dpm) when the first trial was
terminated.
Viral RNA was detected at 1 dpm through 3 dpm from the personal protective equipment (PPE) of LB personnel. In
addition, at 1 dpm, 2 hair/face swabs from MB personnel were positive; however, transmission of virus was not
detected. All swabs of fomite from the HB study personnel were negative.
Conclusions: These results indicate that indirect PEDV transmission through contaminated PPE occurs rapidly
(within 24 h) under modeled conditions. Biosecurity procedures such as changing PPE, washing exposed skin areas,
or taking a shower are recommended for pig production systems and appear to be an effective option for lowering
the risk of PEDV transmission between groups of pigs.
Keywords: Porcine epidemic diarrhea virus, Indirect transmission, Farm personnel, Animal movement, Biosecurity,
Fomites
Background
Porcine epidemic diarrhea (PED) is a highly contagious
viral disease that causes severe diarrhea in pigs [1]. In May
2013, the porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV) was first
reported in the US, causing significant economic losses to
the swine industry due to high mortality rates in piglets.
Over 8 million pigs died due to PEDV, leading to an esti-
mated total industry economic loss of more than 1.8 billion
US dollars [2]. PEDV is an enveloped, single-stranded,
positive-sense RNA virus belonging to the Coronaviridae
family in the genus Alphacoronavirus [1, 3]. The virus is
shed in feces of infected pigs and transmitted via the fecal-
oral route. PEDV can be transmitted either by direct con-
tact between infected and susceptible pigs or indirectly
through contaminated fomites. Transmission via pig trans-
portation has been reported as a major risk factor for the
spread of PEDV [4, 5]. Five percent of PEDV negative
trailers became contaminated during the unloading process
at slaughterhouse facilities handling infected pigs [4].
Contaminated feed has also been implicated in the spread
of PEDV, and both food ingredients (viz. dried spray
plasma) and cross-contamination at the feed mill or from
other sources have been implicated in the spread of PEDV
[6–11]. PEDV has also been detected in air samples and
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aerosol transmission has been suspected as a potential
source of disease transmission in high pig dense areas [12].
In order to mitigate transmission of PEDV within and
between farms, producers employ a range of biosecurity
practices. These practices include disinfecting footwear
and changing clothing of visitors or personnel prior to
entering farm premises, washing and sanitizing delivery
trucks or vehicles entering the farm, and controlling in-
sects. Controlling transmission via feed can be done by
using feed additives such as formaldehyde [13] and
transmission via transport can be minimized by imple-
menting proper cleaning and disinfection methods [14].
However, these implementations are not always practical
or cost effective. The effectiveness of methods to miti-
gate transmission via farm personnel or contaminated
fomites are less understood given that intervention strat-
egies at the farm level have not been properly investi-
gated. Furthermore, Stevenson et al. indicated that even
shower-in/shower-out facilities with excellent biosecurity
protocols also reported PEDV outbreaks [15]. Given the
limited knowledge available on how biosecurity proce-
dures may disrupt the transmission cycle of PEDV, the
present study was undertaken to evaluate the effective-
ness of biosecurity procedures directed at minimizing
transmission via personnel following different biosecur-
ity protocols using a controlled experimental setting.
Methods
Animals and animal housing
Forty-eight, 3-week-old crossbred pigs including both
male and females were obtained from a farm with no
history of PEDV infection and were housed at the St.
Paul animal research isolation units at the University of
Minnesota. After arrival (2 days before the start of the
study), rectal swabs from all pigs were collected and
tested by real-time reverse transcription polymerase
chain reaction (rRT-PCR) for PEDV, transmissible
gastroenteritis virus (TGEV) and porcine delta corona-
virus (PDCoV) at the University of Minnesota Veterinary
Diagnostic Laboratory (St. Paul, MN, USA).
The pigs were housed in 17 separate rooms that were
independently operated from each other as described
below. All individual rooms had anterooms with foot-
baths, a sink for hand and face washing, a storage area
of 2.08 m2, and an animal housing area of 7.28 m2.
Rooms were connected through a clean common hall-
way as shown in Fig. 1. The floor of the animal housing
area was constructed with solid concrete and each ani-
mal housing area had a single water line with two water
nipples as a source of drinking water. Prior to introdu-
cing the pigs into the rooms, environmental swabs were
collected from the floors and confirmed PEDV negative
by rRT-PCR. Ventilation for all rooms was kept under
negative differential pressure to the main corridor,
having one air inlet and one exhaust vent per room.
The air supply was conditioned with a 3 ply panel fil-
ter (TRI-DEK® 15/40, TRI-DIM Filter Corp., Louisa,
VA, USA) and 100% of exhaust air was filtered
through a HEPA filter (XH Absolute HEPA filter,
Camfil, Stockholm, Sweden).
The pigs were randomly distributed as described below
and treated with a single intramuscular dose of enrofloxa-
cin (0.5 mL/pig; Baytril®, Bayer HealthCare AG, Leverkusen,
Germany) to control respiratory disease associated with
Haemophilus parasuis 1 day prior to infection. In the first
trial of the study, forty eight 3-week-old piglets were ran-
domly assigned to 5 experimental groups: (i) 10 pigs were
infected with PEDV and 2 contact sentinel pigs were
housed together to serve as contact sentinels (INF group);
(ii) 10 pigs (5 replicates of 2 each) were assigned to low bio-
security (LB) sentinel groups; (iii) 10 pigs (5 replicates of 2
each) were assigned to medium biosecurity (MB) sentinel
groups; (iv) 10 pigs (5 replicates of 2 each) were assigned to
high biosecurity (HB) sentinel groups and (v) six pigs were
assigned to a negative control (NC) group, which were un-
infected and handled separately. Trial 1 lasted a total of
27 days.
In the 2nd trial of the study, twenty-three 6-week-old
pigs were assigned to 4 different groups: (i) 3 pigs were
infected with PEDV and 1 contact sentinel pig were
assigned to the INF group; (ii) 4 pigs (1 replicate) were
assigned to LB sentinel group; (iii) 12 pigs (3 replicates
of 4 each) were assigned to MB sentinel groups; and (iv)
3 pigs (1 replicate) were assigned to NC group. Trial 2
lasted a total of 13 days.
Study personnel
Study personnel were exclusively assigned to handle pigs
in this study and had no direct contact with other pigs
or with PEDV-infected pigs from another source for the
entire duration of this study. Personnel entering LB, MB,
and HB sentinel rooms had direct contact with infected
pigs in the INF room only and performed all necessary
procedures (e.g. pig fecal swab collection, pig blood col-
lection, feeding of pigs, cleaning of room) in their desig-
nated rooms as assigned during the deputed sampling
and movement days.
Clothing and personal protective equipment
All study personnel showered in the research animal fa-
cility prior to donning the facility-dedicated clothing and
personal protective equipment (PPE). After showering,
personnel put on clean scrubs, a pair of disposable plas-
tic boots and entered the animal isolation corridor after
stepping through an iodine footbath. In the animal isola-
tion clean hallway, personnel put on disposable Tyvek®
coverall (DuPont, Wilmington, DE, USA), nitrile gloves,
and a bouffant cap for the first trial of the study. In the
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2nd trial, a cloth coverall was used instead of Tyvek®
coverall. Upon entry into the anterooms through an-
other iodine footbath, personnel put on face shield and
room-specific rubber boots. Before entering the animal
housing area, personnel put on another pair of dispos-
able plastic boots over their rubber boots.
Experimental design
Infected group (INF)
For the first trial of the study, ten PEDV negative 3-week-
old pigs were inoculated with PEDV (USA/Colorado/
2013) strain of passage 16 via the intra-gastric route. Each
pig was infected with 10 mL of the virus inoculum con-
taining 3.6×104 50% tissue culture infective dose (TCID50)
per mL. Two uninfected PEDV negative 3-week-old pigs
were housed with infected animals to serve as sentinels to
assess transmission by direct contact. During the 2nd trial,
which was performed after the 1st, three PEDV negative
6-week-old pigs were inoculated with gastrointestinal mu-
cosal scrapings obtained from animals infected with the
PEDV virulent strain, by intra-gastric route. An uninfected
6-week-old pig was added to this group as a direct contact
sentinel. All study personnel interacted with infected pigs
for the movements.
Movement between experimental groups
A movement was defined as the process when study
personnel moved from the INF room to either the LB,
MB, or HB sentinel rooms (Table 1). The first movement
started approximately 44 h following the experimental
inoculation of pigs in the INF group at a time when dir-
ect contact transmission was known to have occurred.
Exposure of study personnel to INF pigs
All study personnel who participated in movements be-
tween experimental groups were in contact first with
pigs in the INF group for 45 min. Personnel interacted
directly with the pigs by handling the pigs, collecting
samples from them, and allowing pigs to come in con-
tact with personnel clothes and PPE, e.g. biting, sniffing,
and rubbing. Accordingly, potential infectious secretions
and feces could be transferred to clothing and PPE worn
by the study personnel.
Fig. 1 Movement from infected source group (INF) to low biosecurity group (LB) and INF to medium biosecurity group (MB)
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Movement from infected room to LB rooms
Following the interaction period with pigs in the INF
group, study personnel who were designated to LB
rooms placed their used nitrile gloves, disposable plastic
boots, bouffant cap and coveralls into a clean plastic bag
while in the storage area of the INF room. LB room
study personnel exited INF room through a soiled (out-
side) corridor and entered directly into the LB sentinel
holding room through an exit door in the soiled corri-
dor, without stepping into iodine footbaths (Fig. 1). The
LB room study personnel re-donned their used PPE, in-
cluding nitrile gloves, disposable plastic boots, bouffant
cap and coveralls, in the LB anteroom area. Prior to ini-
tiating contact with LB sentinel pigs, each person col-
lected four separate swab samples from their (i) used
coveralls, (ii) used disposable plastic boots, (iii) used ni-
trile gloves, and (iv) used bouffant cap and face/hair area
in the LB storage area. After collecting the swab sam-
ples, personnel collected rectal swab samples from LB
room sentinel pigs and interacted with LB room sentinel
pigs for 45 min as previously described. All study
personnel designated to LB rooms did not wash their
hands and face prior to contact with LB sentinel pigs.
These movements were scheduled once a day for 9 more
consecutive days and terminated after LB sentinel pigs
tested positive for PEDV.
Movement from infected room to MB rooms
Following interaction with INF pigs, study personnel
collected four separate swabs from the surface of used
(i) coveralls, (ii) disposable plastic boots, (iii) nitrile
gloves, and (iv) bouffant caps and face/hair area in the
INF room storage area. All MB room study personnel
exited the INF room through the anteroom and removed
their used coveralls, disposable plastic boots, latex
gloves, and bouffant cap, and washed their hands and
face with soap and water for approximately 20–40 s ac-
cording to the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) guidelines [18] prior to exiting the room
into the clean corridor (Fig. 1). In the clean hallway,
study personnel donned new coveralls and bouffant cap
and collected four separate fomite swab samples from
the new PPE, including (i) coveralls, (ii) disposable plas-
tic boots, and from their (iii) hands, and (iv) bouffant
cap and hair/face area prior to entering the anteroom of
MB sentinel rooms. Here, study personnel washed again
their hands and face and then, put on gloves, protective
eyewear and room-specific rubber boots. Before entering
the MB room animal housing area, personnel put on an-
other pair of disposable plastic boots over their rubber
boots. MB study personnel collected rectal swab samples
from sentinel pigs and interacted with them, as de-
scribed above. These movements were completed once a
day over nine more consecutive days.
Movement from infected room to HB rooms
The HB animals were housed in a separate building lo-
cated approximately 10 m away. After interacting with
pigs in the LB or MB treatment group, study personnel
showered with soap and shampoo for approximately
10 min before donning a new set of facility-dedicated
scrubs and a pair of new disposable plastic boots. Study
personnel donned new PPE, interacted again with pigs
in the INF group, and took a full shower again before
Table 1 Summary of experimental design and biosecurity procedures followed prior to entry into the low, medium or high
biosecurity rooms and the negative control room





Direct movement from INF to LB through soiled corridor 10 pigs 4 pigs
No change of clothes or footwear between INF and LB 2 pigs/room 4 pigs/room
No washing of hands or face 5 replicates 1 replicate
Medium Biosecurity
(MB)
Movement from INF to MB through clean corridor only
after procedures were followed
10 pigs 12 pigs
Wash hands and face 2 pigs/room 4 pigs/room
Change clothes and footwear 5 replicates 3 replicates
High Biosecurity
(HB)
Movement from INF to HB through clean corridor only
after procedures were followed
10 pigs NA
Shower 2 pigs/room NA
Change clothes and footwear 5 replicates NA
Negative control
(NC)
No movement of people or fomities between INF. LB,
MB or HB and negative control
6 pigs 3 pigs
Dedicated study personnel different from personnel
attending the other groups
6 pigs/room 3 pigs/room
Shower, clean clothes and footwear each time
entering the room
1 replicate 1 replicate
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donning a new set of facility-dedicated scrubs and a pair
of new disposable plastic boots before entering the isola-
tion unit where the HB animals were housed. Study
personnel entered the animal isolation hallway through
an iodine footbath, then donned new coveralls and bouf-
fant cap. Each of the study personnel collected four sep-
arate fomite swab samples from the new PPE, hands,
and bouffant cap and hair/face area as described above.
In the anteroom, study personnel washed their hands
and face again, donned gloves, protective eyewear, and
room-specific rubber boots with disposable plastic boots
over them before entering the animal housing area. All
study personnel collected rectal swab samples from HB
room sentinel pigs and interacted with them as de-
scribed above. These movements were completed twice
a day over nine more consecutive days.
Collection of rectal and fomite swabs
Fomite and rectal swab samples were collected using a
sterile rayon-tipped swab (BD CultureSwab™, liquid Stuart
medium, single plastic applicator, Becton Dickinson and
Co., Sparks, MD, USA). Fomite swabs were collected from
coveralls, disposable plastic boots, hands or nitrile gloves,
bouffant cap, face and hair areas using a zigzag pattern to
cover maximum surface area prior to interacting with pigs
in each biosecurity group. Rectal swabs were collected
daily. Following collection, each swab was suspended in
2 mL transport media solution of Dulbecco’s minimal es-
sential medium (Gibco® DMEM, Thermo Fisher Scientific
Inc., Waltham, MA, USA) containing 2% Bovine Albumin
Fraction V 7.5% solution (Gibco® BSA, Thermo Fisher
Scientific Inc., Waltham, MA, USA), 1% Antibiotic-
Antimycotic, 100× solution (Gibco® Anti-Anti, Thermo
Fisher Scientific Inc., Waltham, MA, USA), 0.15%
Trypsin-TPCK, 1 mg/mL (Sigma-Aldrich, St. Louis, MO,
USA) and 0.1% Gentamicin-Sulfate, 50 mg/mL (Lonza
Inc., Walkersville, MD, USA). An aliquot (50 μL) of the
swab suspension sample was used to extract RNA for
rRT-PCR, and the remainder of the samples were stored
at −80 °C. Swab samples were tested for the presence of
PEDV Spike (S) gene by rRT-PCR. Briefly, RNA was ex-
tracted from eluent using the MagMAX™-96 Viral RNA
Isolation Kit (ThermoFisher Scientific, Waltham, MA,
USA), according to the manufacturer’s instructions. A pri-
mer pair was designed to amplify a portion of the PEDV S
gene with the following sequences: Forward 1910:
ACGTCCCTTTACTTTCAATTCACA and Reverse 2012:
TATACTTGGTACACACATCCAGAGTCA. PCR ampli-
fication was quantified using a FAM labeled probe 1939:
FAM-TGAGTTGATTACTGGCACGCCTAAACCAC-
BHQ. The primers and hydrolysis probe set were added
to the AgPath-ID™ One-Step RT-PCR Reagents (Thermo-
Fisher Scientific, Waltham, MA, USA) with 5 μl of ex-
tracted total RNA and amplified with the ABI 7500 Fast
Real-Time PCR System (Thermo Fisher Scientific,
Waltham, MA, USA) using the following condition: re-
verse transcription at 48 °C for 10 min; denaturation at
95 °C for 10 min; 45 cycles of denaturation at 95 °C for
15 s and annealing at 60 °C for 45 s.
Results
Fecal shedding
In both studies, pigs had limited clinical signs of diarrhea.
Diarrhea was mild and transient in about half of the pigs.
In both studies, PEDV RNA was detected by rRT-PCR
from rectal swabs of pigs in the INF group at 1-day post
infection (dpi), indicative of virus shedding from inocu-
lated pigs. Rectal swabs of direct contact sentinel pigs, co-
housed with the INF group in both trials, tested rRT-PCR
positive at 2 dpi (Tables 2 and 3), 1 day after virus was de-
tected in inoculated pigs. Virus shedding in pigs of the
INF group, measured as viral RNA copies per rectal swab,
peaked at 1 dpi and viral RNA levels remained elevated
through 19 dpi (Fig. 2). During the 2nd trial, rectal swabs
of INF pigs remained positive until 12 dpm when that ex-
periment was terminated (Fig. 3).
Movements were started at 2 dpi of the INF group.
Sentinel pigs in the LB group tested PEDV positive on
rectal swabs 24 h after the first movement. Viral RNA
was detected in 10 out of 10 sentinel pigs during the 1st
trial and 4 out of 4 sentinel pigs in the 2nd trial (Tables
2 and 3). Viral shedding in the LB group of 1st trial was
undetectable after 21 dpm (Fig. 2). Rectal swabs from
pigs in the MB and HB groups tested rRT-PCR negative
during the 10 consecutive days of movement and
remained negative through 24 dpm, when the first trial
Table 2 Number of porcine epidemic diarrhea virus positive pigs (1st trial)
Days Post Infection −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Infection group 0/10 0/10 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10
Infection group sentinel 0/2 0/2 0/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2
Days After Movement 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Low biosecurity 0/10 9/10 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10
Medium biosecurity 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10
High biosecurity 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 0/10
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was terminated. Rectal swabs from pigs in the NC group
remained negative for the entire duration of the study.
Fomite swabs
Fomite swab samples collected on 1, 2, and 3 dpm from
hair/face, hands, coverall, and boots prior to contact
with each group of sentinel pigs were tested by rRT-PCR
to determine where PEDV was carried on each person
that could potentially contribute to virus transmission
(Table 4). Viral RNA was detected at 1 dpm through
3 dpm from all LB group PPE fomite swab samples dur-
ing the first trial. PEDV was detected in one coverall
swab in the 2nd study at 1 dpm and in all PPE at 2 and
3 dpm. In addition, at 1 dpm, 2 hair/face swabs from
MB personnel were positive in the 1st study, even
though transmission of virus was not detected. All fo-
mite swabs from HB study personnel tested negative.
Discussion
Although several aspects of PEDV transmission have
been examined, the efficiency by which biosecurity mea-
sures prevent indirect transmission of PEDV has been
largely unexplored. In the current study, we sought to
address this by modifying biosecurity measures in a con-
trolled experimental design, using study personnel to
simulate movements between rooms that reflect situa-
tions within swine farms around the country. Graded
biosecurity stringency was designed into movements
made by study personnel between a known infected
room and sentinel rooms. As expected, direct-contact
sentinel pigs showed signs of PEDV infection 24 h after
viral shedding was detected in infected pigs supporting
the view that PEDV is highly contagious [16]. Move-
ments between INF and sentinel rooms were designed
to begin when viral shedding peaked in the source group
at 2 dpi. Movements to the LB rooms simulated indirect
transmission in the absence of biosecurity protocols.
Interestingly, transmission to the LB sentinel groups
happened surprisingly rapidly. Virus shedding in the LB
sentinels was detected 24 h after the first movement into
the room again providing proof of the contagious nature
of PEDV. Samples from PPE of all study personnel in
contact with experimentally infected pigs were found to
be contaminated with PEDV by rRT-PCR, and transmit-
ted infection to the LB sentinel pigs even though virus
infectivity on PPE was not tested. This information is
relevant since it helps explain the rapid spread of PEDV
within populations even in the absence of direct contact
pig transmission.
Among the graded biosecurity measures designed to
break the virus transmission cycle, movements into the
MB sentinel groups showed no evidence of transmission
even though swabs from MB study personnel’s hair and
face were PEDV rRT-PCR positive. Transmission of
PEDV with MB protocols may have been limited by low
dose of virus, presence of non-infectious virus, inad-
equate interaction of pigs with contaminated PPE/sur-
faces, or the decreased efficiency of fecal oral
transmission route from these contaminated areas. Simi-
lar experiments using an influenza virus transmission
model showed a breakdown of medium biosecurity mea-
sures after 10 consecutive movements [17]. Swabs from
Table 3 Number of porcine epidemic diarrhea virus positive pigs (2nd trial)
Days Post Infection −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Infection group 0/3 0/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3
Infection group sentinel 0/1 0/1 0/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
Days After Movement 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Low biosecurity 0/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4
Medium biosecurity 0/12 0/12 0/12 0/12 0/12 0/12 0/12 0/12 0/12 0/12 0/12
Fig. 2 Viral shedding of pigs (1st trial). Movements were terminated
at 10 dpi. Data presented are average values of viral RNA copies (±
SD) of infected source group (INF) (n = 12), low biosecurity group
(LB) (n = 10), medium biosecurity group (MB) (n = 10), and high
biosecurity group (HB) (n = 10) groups
Fig. 3 Viral shedding of pigs (2nd trial). Movements were terminated
at 10 dpi. Data presented are average values of viral RNA copies (±
SD) of infected source group (INF) (n = 4), low biosecurity group
(LB) (n = 4), and medium biosecurity group (MB) (n = 12)
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HB group study personnel tested PEDV rRT-PCR nega-
tive even on the hair and face. Similarly, HB sentinel
pigs were rRT-PCR negative for 10 consecutive days.
These results together indicate that taking a shower and
changing PPE before contacting pigs is an ideal way to
completely prevent indirect viral transmission in condi-
tions generally seen in farms. Although our results also
support that only changing PPE and washing skin ex-
posed areas is beneficial to decrease the risk of PEDV
transmission, there may still be an inherent risk of PEDV
transmission from contaminated body surfaces on
personnel. Hence, only changing PPEs might not be the
most effective way to protect against spread of PEDV.
Our results also indicate that breaches in biosecur-
ity procedures can very rapidly transmit PEDV to
naïve herds through indirect means (viz. contaminated
fomites). These findings also suggest that contact with
PEDV contaminated fomites for a sufficient time is an
efficient source of infection and likely plays a role in
the rapid transmission of PEDV when there is ad-
equate contact with fomites. Previous studies have
suggested that fomites may be an effective mode of
PEDV transmission [6, 7, 9, 11–13, 16]. These previ-
ous studies rely on PCR detection of viral RNA
particles or demonstration of infectious PEDV in cell
culture assays to suggest the possibility of transmis-
sion by fomites. For example, airborne transmission
[12], vehicles [4], feed [7, 10, 16], storage bags [6],
personnel working with pigs [6] and other fomites
have tested positive for PEDV indicating their possible
role in viral transmission and should be considered as
a source for virus spread. However, these studies lack
a tangible demonstration of the ability of contami-
nated fomites to infect pigs, either in an experimental
setting or in a farm, except for the role of contami-
nated feed. The present study provides evidence that
personnel exposed to infected pigs can transmit the
virus to a naïve population, when basic biosecurity
procedures are not followed.
The experimental design in the present studies allowed
a 45-min contact time with animals under the assumption
that most routine activities in a farm, based on the size of
the pen and number of pigs housed, may be completed
within that time frame. However, one cannot rule out the
possibility that transmission may occur with medium bio-
security, if longer interaction periods or larger infected
source groups were used in the design. Contact with in-
fected pigs for more than 45 min and/or 10 movements
Table 4 Number of porcine epidemic diarrhea virus positive fomite swabs prior to contact with pigs in the respective groups and
mean (±SD) cycle threshold RT-PCR values for positive samples
Group Swab Movement day
1st study 2nd study
1 2 3 1 2 3
Negative Bouffant cap, hair,
face area
(0/5)a (0/5) (0/5) (0/4) (0/4) (0/4)
Coverall (0/5) (0/5) (0/5) (0/4) (0/4) (0/4)
Hands (0/5) (0/5) (0/5) (0/4) (0/4) (0/4)
Boots (0/5) (0/5) (0/5) (0/4) (0/4) (0/4)
LB Bouffant cap, hair,
face area
(3/5) (31.58 ± 1.03) b (2/5) (33.62 ± 0.16) (5/5) (32.66 ± 1.58) (0/1) (1/1) (31.62) (1/1) (33.58)
Coverall (5/5) (26.16 ± 3.17) (5/5) (29.28 ± 2.22) (5/5) (27.96 ± 3.96) (1/1) (33.40) (1/1) (29.27) (1/1) (24.60)
Used gloves (5/5) (28.81 ± 3.83) (4/5) (28.01 ± 2.98) (5/5) (28.76 ± 2.21) (0/1) (1/1) (28.03) (1/1) (30.01)
Boots (5/5) (26.30 ± 4.44) (5/5) (27.42 ± 6.22) (5/5) (24.51 ± 3.94) (0/1) (1/1) (28.74) (1/1) (28.54)
MB Bouffant cap, hair,
face area
(2/5) (30.75 ± 0.93) (0/5) (0/5) (0/3) (0/3) (0/3)
Coverall (0/5) (0/5) (0/5) (0/3) (0/3) (0/3)
Hands (0/5) (0/5) (0/5) (0/3) (0/3) (0/3)
Boots (0/5) (0/5) (0/5) (0/3) (0/3) (0/3)
HB Bouffant cap, hair,
face area
(0/5) (0/5) (0/5)
Coverall (0/5) (0/5) (0/5)
Hands (0/5) (0/5) (0/5)
Boots (0/5) (0/5) (0/5)
a Number of positive
b Ct value (avg. ± S.D)
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could have increased the probability of PEDV transmis-
sion to naïve sentinel pigs. However, we observed that
with low biosecurity procedures, transmission and infec-
tion of PEDV was both efficient and rapid. This data pro-
vides evidence that spread of PEDV within farms may
occur efficiently with failures in biosecurity procedures.
Results presented here should be considered carefully
as many factors, including contact time, exposure time,
viral dose, time after exposure to virus and other experi-
mental conditions may influence the outcome of trans-
mission studies. However, this experimental study
highlights the main advantages of good biosecurity pro-
cedures in breaking the transmission cycle between
rooms. The fact that PEDV transmission occurred under
low biosecurity procedures indicated that the virus could
spread easily through contaminated fomites worn by
personnel. These results provide critical information to
develop effective biosecurity procedures and will have
potential applications for the development and imple-
mentation of transmission control policies in swine pro-
duction systems. Our results are also relevant to design
biosecurity measures to control the spread of other
pathogens of similar characteristics and transmission
routes than PEDV such as transmissible gastroenteritis
virus and porcine deltacoronavirus.
Conclusions
In conclusion, these results indicate the indirect trans-
mission of PEDV through contaminated personnel PPEs
occurs rapidly under modeled conditions and to prevent
transmission between groups of pigs, changing PPE and/
or taking a shower is recommended as an effective op-
tion to lower the risk of virus spread.
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